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20 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Comments on FBI Monograph "Communist
Influence in the Dominican Rebel
Movement"

1. This FBI study was not coordinated with CIA, either in the ODI or ODP side of the Agency.

2. The FBI memorandum, which claims only to be a "compilation of pertinent reports" is, in effect, a study of Communist influence in the rebel movement based on CIA and FBI reports. Designed to demonstrate the "alarming degree of Communist participation in and leadership of the rebel movement," the memorandum does a disservice by relying to an unnecessary degree on unevaluated reports--some of them probably untrue--and by the liberal use of innuendo. There is no need for this tortuous treatment. The information derived from [REDACTED] is sufficient to prove the case--if it is given logical, orderly treatment. The FBI memorandum, in short, smacks of trying too hard to prove a point and might well antagonize a skeptical reader.

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3. The memorandum is divided into five separate sections. Each is discussed separately below.

Section I - Early Communist Influence in Rebel Movement

4. This appears to be heavily based on pp. 5-12 of the CIA memorandum of 7 May or on one of its off-spring. The overall structure, organization and interpretation is very similar and often identical. Most of the factual material is based on CIA reports and

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some of the new information is questionable, such as the statement that Fidelio Despradel Roques, a leading APCJ member, is Casmano's private secretary (p.6).

5. A good part of this section seems to be a paraphrase of our earlier memo. For example, the following parts of the FBI memo compare with the referenced pages in ours:

<u>FBI</u>	<u>CIA</u>
P. 1, opening line	P. 1, opening line
P. 5, top line	P. 11, top line
P. 7, last paragraph	P. 12, last paragraph

Section II - Bosch Control of Casmano Forces, pp. 8-12

6. The overall interpretation of this section is that Bosch is the "man behind the scenes" in the rebel government and is largely [REDACTED]

It ignores all the additional evidence that points to the conclusion that [REDACTED] are an attempt on his part to retain some influence in the rebel camp and that Bosch is often misled or lied to by the Santo Domingo rebels who often use him to do their bidding. A portion of this section is drawn from the earlier FBI memo, [REDACTED]

Section III - Current Communist Influence in the Rebel Movement

7. This section is a collection mainly of CIA and FBI reports. The former is the source of at least 60% of the paragraphs of this section, while the latter's reports are the basis of about 25%. Interestingly enough, the first page of this section is almost entirely FBI. There is no evaluation, synthesis or interpretation offered, the reports being only in a rough chronological order. The paragraphs that appear to be based on FBI material make several statements that are suspect. [REDACTED]

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Section IV - Communist Influence on Bosch, pp. 21-23

8. This section attempts, by inference, to paint Bosch as a Communist or a conscious Communist puppet, whereas our evaluation is that he is naive and susceptible to Communist influence.

[REDACTED]

The FBI fails to evaluate this report and does not note that this figure is about ten times more than the total membership and sympathizers of the three Dominican extremist parties.

Section V - Communists Prepare for the Future, pp. 24-26

9. This section has as its theme the idea that the Communists are making plans to take over any future government that might be set up. The main evidence offered to support this point is CIA reports of arms being smuggled into the interior. While we are in general agreement with this point, the FBI's report offers no analysis and interpretation concerning the obstacles the Communists must face, such as military opposition and the inertia of the peasants, before they can carry out a successful campaign of guerrilla warfare.

E. J. SMITH
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence

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